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ABSTRACT. Policy integration and conflict resolutions among various 
organizations still remain a major challenge. Moreover, policy inconsistency 
detection approach with logical reasoning techniques which considers 
integration requirements from collaboration parties has not been well 
studied. In this paper, we proposed a model to detect inconsistencies based 
on role-based access control (RBAC) that considers role hierarchy (RH) and 
temporal and spatial constraints. A model to prune and collect only the 
required policies based on access control requirements from different 
organizations is designed. Policy inconsistency detection should be 
enhanced with logical-based analysis in order to develop security policy 
integration. We believe this work could provide manner to filter a large 
amount of unrelated policies and only return potential collaboration policies 
for conflict resolution. 
Keywords: policy inconsistency detection, collaborative environment, role-
based access control (RBAC), role hierarchy, constraints 
INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays there are increasing needs for sharing data that contain personal information 
among various cross-organizational collaborations. Thus, there is a need for a dynamic 
architecture in order to share data among different cross-organizations in collaborative 
environments since each organization may join or leave at runtime. However, often such data 
sharing may contain personal sensitive and confidential information, such as family 
composition and DNA. It still remains a major challenge to ensure security issues for such 
data sharing in collaborative environment. 
Security concerns with confidentiality, integrity and availability of data. Thus, cross-
organizational data sharing should focus on the security access control to avoid sensitive data 
from being accessed by unauthorized users. Collaboration between organizations for the 
purpose of data sharing will involve security policy integration since each organization may 
independently specify its own security policies based on its own interest. Policy integration is 
a process to integrate security policies from the participating organizations in order to govern 
the data sharing throughout the collaborations. Our access control policies are mainly 
designed for role hierarchies and context constraints in RBAC model.  
During the policy integration phase, the policies to collaborate from different 
organizations are compared and evaluated through logical-based analysis. Various 
inconsistencies between access policies from different distributed units may occur when 
elements conflict with each other between different policies from collaborating parties. Thus, 
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inconsistency detection is not only important to achieve a conflict-free collaboration 
environment but also the availability, confidentiality and integrity in security issues.  
However, the policy inconsistency detection approach with semantic reasoning techniques 
which considers integration requirements from collaboration parties has not been well studied. 
In this paper, we proposed a model to detect inconsistencies based on the role-based access 
control (RBAC) model that considers role hierarchy (RH) and temporal and spatial 
constraints. A model to prune and collect only the required policies based on access control 
requirements from different organizations is designed. Policy inconsistency detection should 
be enhanced with logical reasoning techniques in order to develop security policy integration. 
We believe this work could provide a manner to filter a large amount of unrelated policies and 
only return potential collaboration policies for conflict resolutions. 
The paper is organized as follow. The literature review is discussed in the following 
section. This is followed by the presentation of our proposed model for policy inconsistency 
detection with logic-based analysis and classification of inconsistencies. The last section will 
conclude our work. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
There are a few previous studies that use Description Logic (DL) reasoning to prove that 
two policies are suitable, or not suitable, for collaboration purposes (He & Yang, 2009; 
Huang, Huang, & Liu, 2009). DL that is encoded in these studies can be used to determine the 
satisfiability of a concept. A study in He & Yang, 2009 concentrated on the analysis to show 
that different types of collaboration impose different ways of integration. This proposed 
model has limitation as only some of the policy inconsistencies have been encoded in the 
authorization RBAC policy model which is limited in certain case studies. Three types of 
inconsistencies are identified in this work; role inconsistencies, credential inconsistencies, and 
privilege inconsistencies. Huang, Huang, & Liu, 2009 work extended the existing eXtensible 
Markup Language (XACML) architecture which can support policy conflict detection based 
on their proposed DL method, but this study will always omit the attributes of condition. DL 
is a famous knowledge representation because it can express concept and relationship 
between concepts.  However, this satisfiability (SAT) solver based analysis is unable to 
present an integrated view of relationships among policies. Besides that, these works do not 
consider context constraints and role hierarchy. 
Previous studies worked with similarity measurement to calculate the similarity scores 
between policies (Lin, Rao, Bertino, & Lobo, 2007; Yau & Chen, 2008). However, this work 
needs to be incorporated with other analysis tools in order to improve the result of conflict 
detection.  The higher the score the more similar the two policies are. Otherwise, the request 
to access data is rejected by the data owner. The determination of similarity between 
structures in policies is computationally cheaper but less precise technique compared to 
matching them in full details based on logical reasoning or model-based checking (Bertino, 
Brodie, & Calo, 2010). The main drawback with this similarity score computation is that user 
intervention is required to prior match knowledge or tune parameters such as providing 
additional manual work to assign the weight value for emphasizing the importance of the 
target or condition similarity respectively. In summary from the above studies, the data owner 
always has the priority to do the access decision to maintain its data in the resource owner on 
which policy is most similar to data owner. However, each organization should have the right 
to claim ownership of the data. Thus, it is unreasonable to give the priority to the data owner 
to decide the chance for collaboration between organizations.  
Mazzoleni, Crispo, Bertino, & Sivasubramanian, 2008 only discussed the semantic 
relationships on pair wise constraint elements among policies which always assume 
corresponding elements between policies are the same in value with each other. Oliva & 
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Saltor, 2000 presented a mandatory access control policy to endow tightly coupled federated 
database systems with a multilevel security system. However, this work is limited to specify 
the relationships between subject elements while the others elements such as constraints are 
always omitted in detection phases. Huang, Sun, Wang, & Si, 2009 identified the types of 
redundancies and inconsistencies during the policy redundancy and inconsistency checking. 
However, this work is limited to presenting for the inconsistency of intra-organization. We 
believe this method cannot scale well with a larger set of policies analysis among 
collaboration organizations. 
Park & Lee 2007 presents an access control mechanism using temporal and spatial context 
information to patient information. Temporal context information classifies time into two 
types - doctor’s regular working time and other time while spatial context information 
classifies location into three spaces; inner medical office, outer medical office in hospitals, 
and other places. In the RBAC policy application environment, context constraints play a 
critical role in order to maintain database security (Kumar & Newman, 2009). Thus, our work 
considers not only the temporal constraints, but also the spatial constraints in policy 
inconsistency detection. 
Our study discussed the RBAC issues under context constraints and role hierarchy in a 
collaboration environment to further guarantee consistency policy integration in a 
collaboration environment. It is necessary for us to carry out a larger, yet feasible 
implementation that will provide the scenario required for more comprehensive policy 
integration. 
THE PROPOSED MODEL 
The Security Policy (SP) in our study is defined as follows: 
SP= (R, PM, C, E), where R = Role (e.g., Physician), PM = Permission and is defined as a 
pair <RE, A>, where RE is Resource (e.g., patient information) and A is Action of data (e.g., 
read), C = Constraint, and E = Effect (e.g., permit or deny). Constraint information that is 
included in the policy is temporal and spatial contexts. 
Each organization may specify its own security policies independently. Thus, our proposed 
model aims at filtering the unrelated policies and analyzing the types of inconsistencies which 
may occur among policies from different organizations for collaborations. The following 
describes our proposed model which consists of two phases, namely: policy pruning and 
policy inconsistency detection. Figure 1 shows our policy inconsistency detection model for 
security policy integration process. 
The linked image cannot be displayed.  The file may have been moved, renamed, or deleted. Verify that the link points to the correct file and location.
 
Figure 28. The Policy Inconsistency Detection Model. 
 
Now let us explain how the policy inconsistency detection model can detect 
inconsistencies which always exist between collaborative organizations. For example, let us 
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consider three different hospitals which intend to collaborate with each other; hospital A with 
policies 1A , 2A , and 3A , hospital B with policies 1B , 2B , and 3B , and hospital C with policies 
1C and 2C  as specified below. 
Organization A : 
1A : (Surgeon, Therapy Treatment∨ Patient Personal Data, Read, 09:00 ≤ Time ≤ 17:00∧
Inner Hospital, Permit) 
2A : (Specialist Physician, Treatment History, Update, Outer Office, Deny) 
3A : (Mental Nurse, Bone X-Ray∨ Patient Personal Data, Read, Inner Hospital, Deny) 
Organization B : 
1B : (Nurse, Bone X-Ray, Read, Inner Hospital, Permit) 
2B : (Specialist Physician, Therapy Treatment∨ Patient Personal Data, Read∨ Write, Outer 
Office, Permit) 
3B : (Laboratory Scientist, Laboratory Sample, Read∨ Write∨ Update, Inner Lab, Permit) 
Organization C : 
1C : (Specialist Physician, Therapy Treatment, Read∨ Write, (09:00 ≤ Time ≤ 12:30 ∨ 13.30 
≤ Time ≤ 18:00) ∧ Inner Office, Permit) 
2C : (Laboratory Scientists, Blood Sample, Read∨ Write∨ Update∨ Delete, Inner Lab, 
Permit) 
Policy Pruning Phase 
The policy pruning phase filters the policies from those organizations that are unrelated 
before the organizations engage in collaboration. If a pair wise policy similar with each 
others, then these two policies are the potential candidates for the checking in the next phase, 
which is the policy inconsistency detection phase, before a common set of integrated policies 
are generated. Assume that, aP  = { aR , aRE , aA , aC , aE }  and bP = { bR , bRE , bA , bC , bE }. 
Five cases are identified as follows which show how the policy pruning phase works in our 
model. 
 ba RR ≠  (5) 
For example, policy 1A  and policy 1B  will not have further checking since the analysis 
shows that these two policies are different based on the role element. Thus, referring to the 
case above, policy 1A  and 1B  will be pruned out in this phase. 
 =∩∧≤ baba RERERRif ()( )  
(2) 
For example, policy 3B specified “Laboratory Scientist” which is the junior role of 
“Specialist Physician” in policy 1C . However, the set of resources specified in 3B  
is disjoint 
with the set of resources specified in policy 1C . Thus, referring to the case above, policy 3B  
and 1C  will be pruned out in this phase.  
 =∩∧⊆∧≤ )()[()( bababa AARERERRif ) 
(3) 
For example policy 2A  
specified “Specialist Physician” which is the same role specified in 
policy 2B . The resource, “Treatment History” which is specified in 2A  is a superset of 
“Therapy Treatment” which is specified in 2B . However, the set of actions specified in 2A  is 
disjoint with the set of actions specified in policy 2B . Thus, referring to the case above, policy 
2A  and 2B will be pruned out in this phase. 
Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Computing and Informatics, ICOCI 
2011,8-9 June, 2011 Bandung, Indonesia  
Paper No.  
131 
 
337 
 
 )]()[()( bababa AARERERRif ⊆∧⊆∧≤  
(4) 
For example, policy 1A  specified “Surgeon” role which is the junior role in policy 2B  since 
this policy specified “Specialist Physician” in the role element. “Therapy Treatment” and 
“Patient Personal Data” in policy 1A  is the same as the resource elements in policy 2B while 
the action element of policy 1A is a subset of policy 2B . This case satisfies case 4, policies 1A  
and 2B  
are considered as potential pair wise candidates for collaboration which will be 
submitted to the policy inconsistency detection phase for further checking. 
)]()[(
)]()[()]()[()(
baba
bababababa
AARERE
AAREREAARERERRif
⊆∧⊇∨
⊇∧⊆∨⊇∧⊇∧≤
 (5) 
For example, policy 3A specified the “Mental Nurse” role, which is the junior role of 
“Nurse” in policy 1B . However, “Bone X-Ray” and “Patient Personal Data” in resource 
element of policy 3A  is a superset of “Bone X-Ray” in policy 1B . The action element of policy
3A is the same as the policy 1B . Thus, the analysis between policies 3A and 1B  is identified as 
role hierarchy inconsistencies before these two policies submit to the policy inconsistency 
detection phase for further checking.  
 It is not recommended to generate a set of policies shared by collaboration organizations 
based only on this phase. Those policies which are identified as potential collaborate 
candidates in this phase are submitted to the next phase, the policy inconsistency detection 
phase, for further details checking. 
Policy Inconsistency Detection Phase 
After the pruning phase is performed the unrelated policies are filtered while the related 
policies are further analysed. In this phase, the condition and the effect of the elements are 
checked. Two cases are identified to indicate that two policies are similar as follows: 
 if  ba EE ≡ ∧ )]()()()[( babababa CCCCCCCC ⊄∨∩∨⊇∨⊆  (6) 
For example, policies 1A  and 2B  are considered similar to each other after the pruning 
phase. We found that policy 1A is more restricted than policy 2B  with the respect of temporal 
and spatial conditions. In this case, it is infeasible to make decision without analysing the 
contents of the conditions in details since the further negotiation is needed in the 
inconsistency resolution. We classified these possible pair wise policies as constraints 
inconsistencies. 
 if  ba EE ≠ ∧ )]()()[( bababa CCCCCC ∩∨⊇∨⊆  
(7) 
For example, policies 3A and 1B are considered similar to each other after the pruning 
phase. In the condition element, we found that the spatial information identified in policy 3A  
is “Inner Hospital” with denied access decision which is the same as the spatial condition 
element in policy 1B with permit access decision. We cannot simply make decision without 
analysing the details in this kind of cases. Thus, we classified it as authorization 
inconsistencies where further negotiation is needed in the inconsistency resolution. 
CONCLUSION 
To briefly conclude, our work is to present a policy inconsistency detection model, based 
on a role-based access control that considers both the role hierarchy and the temporal and 
spatial constraints in policy inconsistency detection. The policy inconsistency detection model 
presented is to identify various types of inconsistencies among policies. The policy 
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inconsistency detection solution is not limited to inter-organizational collaboration in the 
Healthcare domain, but is also applicable to other domains as well. The proposed policy 
inconsistency detection model can be considered as a generic model. We believe this work 
could provide a manner to filter a large amount of unrelated policies and only return potential 
collaboration policies for conflict resolutions. Thus, in the future we intend to extend this 
study to investigate the policy inconsistency resolution for each type of inconsistencies. 
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